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Reason and revelation: setting the scene

In 1710 the Essais de Théodicée by G. W. Leibniz (1646-1716) appeared in Amsterdam. Leibniz’s vindication of the justice and goodness of God, despite the existence of evil, opened with a ‘Preliminary Discourse on the Conformity of Faith with Reason’: 

I begin with the preliminary question of the conformity of faith with reason, and the use of philosophy in theology, because it has much influence on the main subject of my treatise, and because M. Bayle introduces it everywhere. I assume that two truths cannot contradict each other; that the object of faith is the truth God has revealed in an extraordinary way; and that reason is the linking together of truths, but especially (when it is compared with faith) of those whereto the human mind can attain naturally without being aided by the light of faith. (§ 1; GP VI, 49; Theodicy, p. 73)

The debate about faith and reason, theology and philosophy had raged throughout the previous century. The pleasing harmony between faith and reason, in which reason provided the praeambula fidei (preambles of faith) by demonstrating the existence of God and some of his attributes, and thereby ushered in the truths of faith knowable only by divine revelation, had been questioned by the Protestant Reformation. Some Protestant strands embraced a more dramatic philosophical anthropology according to which Adam’s original fall had deeply damaged the natural light of reason. Was it possible for such weak and fallible instrument to judge of divine matters? From this standpoint the centuries-long barrage of objections to the proofs of God’s existence could simply be swept aside by acknowledging the utter inadequacy of reason unaided by revelation in grasping supernatural truths. According to this view, rather than proving God’s existence, let alone proving his attributes, fallen human reason had proved its inability to reach any certainty on such issues. For religious truth one had to turn to revelation. To know about God one had to read Scripture alone, not the obscure philosophical speculations of councils and scholastics. Some pressed the further point that natural reason was not merely agnostic about the divine realm: it led to conclusions opposite to those of revelation. In the early seventeenth century, for instance, a furious debate had divided German Lutherans about the legitimacy of the use of philosophy in theology and the so-called doctrine of double truth, one philosophical, the other theological.​[1]​
Pierre Bayle (1647-1706), at least officially a Calvinist, had been at the forefront of the party which denied that human reason had the power to settle any substantive question regarding God. In his widely read Dictionaire historique et critique (2nd ed: Rotterdam 1702), Bayle maintained that as soon as reason built something it showed how to demolish it, as “a true Penelope which during the night unravels the fabric weaved during the day” (Dictionaire, 740). Reason was “a way which leads astray” (Dictionaire, 2432) due to its weakness and its constant doubting. It could show errors but would soon attack truths, confusing the mind and corroding the very core of everything.​[2]​ It was “a principle of destruction, and not of edification” (Dictionaire, 2026). In particular, Bayle maintained, human reason was incapable of reconciling the existence of an immensely good, all-knowing and all-powerful God with the presence of so much evil in the word.​[3]​ The fact that reason raised insoluble objections against the truths of faith should not result, however, in a rejection of faith. One must instead silence reason, recognizing its inability to reach truth.​[4]​
The separation between faith and reason had been explicitly maintained also by a contemporary whose impact on Bayle is a matter of wide discussion. In chapter XIV of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus anonymously published in 1670, Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) had claimed that “between faith and theology on the one side and philosophy on the other there is no relation and no affinity”. Indeed, according to Spinoza, they “are as far apart as can be. The aim of philosophy is, quite simply, truth, while the aim of faith … is nothing other than obedience and piety.” (Theological-Political Treatise, 519). Faith was not concerned with truth but with practice. The faithful were not those who believed some true doctrines but those who behaved in a certain way, that is, those who followed “justice and charity”. To know the truth about God, one had to read Spinoza’s Ethica, not the Bible. The latter needed to be studied as any other historical text. This approach would uncover that the Bible was not the word of God but a collection of books and documents produced by an array of authors guided by basically political aims. Miracles were just “unusual works of Nature”, the causes of which were unknown (chap. VI); prophecy depended solely on the imagination (chap. I); and the prophets’ teaching “concerning the attributes of God was in no way singular. Their beliefs about God were shared by the vast majority of their time, and their revelations were accommodated to these beliefs” (chap. II; Theological-Political Treatise, 410); Moses was an astute leader who managed to present his own law as divine commands. The bottom line was the complete separation between the rational inquiry of philosophy and the faithful approach of theology. In the Appendix to part I of the Ethica, Spinoza explained the common anthropomorphic conception of God as a result of ignorance and slavery to passions. 
For his part, Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) had endorsed the view that the gods were first born out of fear due to the ignorance of causes, and stressed the role played by emotions as sources of belief: 

they that make little, or no enquiry into the natural causes of things, yet from the fear that proceeds from the ignorance it self, of what it is that hath the power to do them much good or harm, are inclined to suppose, and feign unto themselves, several kinds of Powers Invisible; and stand in awe of their own Imaginations; and in time of distress to invoke them; as also in the time of expected good success, to give them thanks; making the creatures of their own fancy, their Gods.”   (Leviathan 1651, Part I, ch. 11, p. 51; see also Part I, ch. 12 ‘Of Religion’).

Whether or not Bayle was sincere in the fideistic outcome of his own assessment of the gulf between faith and reason, Leibniz was quick to point out that “M. Bayle” wanted “to make reason be silent, after having made it talk too much” (Theodicy,
“Preface”; GP VI, 39). Bayle wrote eloquently and extensively concerning the ways in which human reason was baffled and scandalized by the opposition that it seemed to uncover at every turn between its conclusions and the conclusions of revelation; and these writings convinced many that traditional religion needed to be purged of various doctrines in order to become a respectable source of knowledge about God. 
This conclusion was also reached by a multifaceted religious movement which had started its journey from the premise of the conformity between faith and reason still shared by many Catholic and Protestant, including Leibniz himself. Antitrinitarianism, chiefly represented in the seventeenth century by Socinianism,​[5]​ had found in the Bible no explicit mention of the Trinity – no wonder, in the Socinians’ view, since they regarded this doctrine as clearly against reason and therefore not to be expected in God’s revelation. By rejecting the Trinity, they also denied the dogma of the divinity of Jesus Christ, which therefore joined the steadily growing list of allegedly irrational doctrines to be expurgated from Christianity. By the late seventeenth century, Socinianism had gained a firm foothold in England under the name of Unitarianism. The violence with which it was opposed by members of the established Church, and the facility with which the charge of Socinianim was hurled at any one suspected of heterodoxy, were measures of the pervasiveness of its perceived treat to orthodoxy. Persecution did not, however, prove particularly effective. Unitarianism spread throughout Britain not only amongst Scots Presbyterians and Christian denominations which did not conform to the Church of England. Even the Anglican Church saw prominent members leaning toward antitrinitarianism.
Although neither an antitrinitarian nor (more specifically) a Socinian, the Dutch jurist and political theorist Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) had also been accused by his enemies of commending a Socinian-like, drastically minimalist Christian creed which was silent about key Christian dogmas. His hugely successful and influential De Veritate Religionis Christianae, published in 1627, argued for the truth of the Christian religion by showing “the reasonableness of believing and embracing” it.​[6]​ This claim was based on three main considerations: the agreement of the Christian religion with the conclusions of natural reason concerning the existence of God and his attributes; the authenticity and reliability of Scripture; and the morally excellent teaching contained especially in the New Testament. The typically Protestant emphasis on Scripture as the source of what a Christian should be required to believe did not disturb prominent Roman Catholics, who were pleased with Grotius’s effective defence of the Christian religion. Ironically it was hard-line Calvinists who took offence at the work of this thinker from a different brand of the Reformed tradition. They denounced the lack of an explicit defence of the dogma of the Trinity in Grotius’s work as a sign of crypto-Socinianism. In fact, rather than covert antitrinitarianism, Grotius’s approach to the Christian religion in De Veritate was in line with his long-standing view that division amongst Christians could and should be overcome by distinguishing between fundamental and non-fundamental articles of faith. Since, according to this view, all fundamental articles were explicitly contained in Scripture, Christians should simply be encouraged to read the Bible instead of engaging in sterile doctrinal controversies.
By the end of the seventeenth century, the majority of the Church of England’s divines had embraced the same approach. The so-called ‘Latitudinarians’ maintained that theological agreement needed to be reached only on a few, fundamental articles of faith clearly contained in Scripture. The rest could be left to individual opinion and interpretation. No less a philosopher than John Locke (1632-1704) shared this view. Yet the problem still remained of agreeing on the short-list of fundamental articles. In his Reasonableness of Christianity (1695), Locke combed the New Testament in search of what it said needed to be believed in order to be a Christian. Locke’s answer pared down to a minimum the Creed requirements: the only article of faith expressly required to become a Christian was to recognize Jesus of Nazareth as the Messiah. The shortness of the list did not fail to cause trouble for Locke. It was soon his turn to rebut the charge of having denied central planks of the Christian revelation such as the doctrine of the Trinity. 
On the other hand, it is beyond doubt that Locke had defended both the need for revelation and the epistemic space for a class of truths above human reason. So had Leibniz. Truth can never be against reason but it can be above (finite human) reason. This is the specific realm of revelation.​[7]​ Other thinkers, however, followed Locke only part of the way. They espoused his (fully traditional) view that truth cannot be against reason but did not assign any space to truths genuinely above (human) reason. In the wake of the Socinian project of expurgating from Christianity all the incomprehensible doctrines which, in their view, could not but be against reason, and galvanized by a trend which had already reduced the specific content of the Christian revelation to a minimum, a broad range of thinkers summoned revelation before the tribunal of reason. Convinced by Bayle’s plethora of purportedly irresolvable objections raised by reason against many traditional articles of faith, they entrusted reason with the last word on what could or could not be accepted in religion.

The tribunal of reason 

The label commonly assigned to thinkers who regarded natural reason as the ultimate judge of what counts as true religion is that of ‘Deists’. Like any label, it cannot capture the full complexity of positions advanced by very diverse sets of authors spanning various European countries. Typically, however, Deism was associated with acceptance of natural religion (that is, a religion with purely rational tenets fully reachable by human reason unaided by revelation) at the expense of revelation. It ranged from moderate positions – which still acknowledged revelation and its usefulness, but saw it as reducible to natural religion -- to more radical views which rejected the need for revelation altogether, denied that any authentic divine revelation had ever in fact occurred, and denounced all alleged revelations as dangerous and vulgar deceptions. Some authors conceived of God as an absentee divinity who was the cause of the world but was neither needed for the running of the mighty world-machine nor caring toward its inhabitants.​[8]​ Whereas not every ‘Deist’ was equally vociferous in his anti-clericalism, a notable common feature was acid criticism of ecclesiastical institutions and their perceived abuse of power. The refusal to recognize, let alone submit to, church authorities earned them the (far from universally applauded) reputation of ‘freethinkers’.
One of these controversial ‘freethinkers’ was John Toland (1670-1722). “I hold nothing as an Article of my Religion”, Toland declared, “but what the highest Evidence forc’ed me to embrace” (Christianity not mysterious, ‘Preface’). Self-professed disciple of Locke and admirer of his Essay, he clothed his own views in Lockian terms. In the process, he managed to create serious problems for Locke, who found himself forced to defend himself from supporting views he had never proposed. The two-line title of Toland’s famous Christianity not mysterious: or, A treatise shewing, that there is nothing in the gospel contrary to reason, nor above it (London 1696) made short work of the carefully drawn distinction between ‘above reason’ and ‘contrary to reason’ tenaciously defended by Locke, Leibniz, and others. In his hasty notes on Toland’s book, Leibniz put his finger precisely on this distinction as the keystone which, once removed, caused the collapse of the epistemic space proper to revealed truths. Although it was perfectly appropriate, Leibniz argued, to maintain that nothing contrary to reason, that is, nothing absurd, should be part of the Christian religion, the same did not apply to what was above reason, that is, to revealed truths which our finite mind could not comprehend (Leibniz, Annotatiunculae subitaneae; Dutens V, 142-143). Toland, on the other hand, did not really distinguish between above and contrary to reason, or between being incomprehensible and being absurd. In his view, alleged incomprehensible truths were simply absurdities concocted by the clergy. There were none of these in the genuine evangelic message. He did not deny that truths had been divinely revealed in the Gospel, but crucially claimed that, once revealed, they could be understood “as any other Matter in the World” (Christianity not mysterious, 140). Alongside revelation, miracles as well were still admitted but merely as events “produc’d according to the Laws of Nature, tho above its ordinary Operations” (Christianity not mysterious, 150).
These claims were not unprecedented. Joachim Stegmann the Elder (1595-1633) -- a leading exponent of late, more radically rationalistic Socinianism -- had already maintained in his posthumously published De judice et norma controversiarum fidei Libri II (1644) that nothing in the original Christian revelation is above reason. In 1633 the book De Veritate​[9]​ by Herbert of Cherbury (1583-1648) listed five notitiae communes (common notions) which constituted, in his view, the fundamental tenets of true religion. According to Herbert these notions were a common inheritance of humankind. No special, historical revelation was needed for their discovery, since they were known by people of all times and places through natural reason. For salvation it was enough to acknowledge that there is a supreme Deity, that worship is due to this supreme Deity, that the most important aspect of this worship was a life of virtue and piety, that vices and wicked actions must be expiated by repentance, and that there is reward or punishment after this life (Herbert of Cherbury 1633, 208-221). The true catholic or universal church was defined by these common notions. In turn, Charles Blount’s Miracles no Violations of the Laws of Nature, published in London in 1683, had defended a naturalistic explanation of miracles, while his Summary Account of the Deists Religion (1686) represented a manifesto of early Deism. “The Deists Opinion of God” was summarized as follows “Whatsoever is Adorable, Amiable, and Imitable by Mankind, is one Supream [sic] infinite and perfect Being” (Blount 1686, 88). The final words “Satis est nobis Deus unus [one God is enough for us]” implicitly attacked Trinitarianism in favour of the purer rational religion embraced by the Deists. By the time Toland was writing, Spinoza’s naturalistic explanation of miracles and prophecies in the Tractatus had also percolated through European anti-establishment communities. Toland’s theses fell on fertile soil, in which they could rapidly put down roots, grow and multiply.
Amongst the contretemps of Deist and anti-Deist pamphlets, Matthew Tindal’s Christianity as old as the Creation: or, The Gospel, a republication of the Religion of Nature (1730) offered a classic statement of the explicit reduction of religion to natural religion, of which the Gospel was supposed to be a mere reiteration. The trouble was that the Gospel turned out to be a rather bad copy of the original, not least due to the obscurity of Scripture. The problem was further compounded by the “Ecclesiasticks” – “the real Encouragers of Immorality” (Tindal 1730, 145) -- who had used revelation as a tool of power. Clearly, it was better to dispense with the “republication” and just rely on the “religion of nature” which, free from the weight of clerical accretions and institutional paraphernalia, could bask in the light of reason. This religion consisted “in observing those Things, which our Reason, by considering the Nature of God and Man, and the Relation we stand in to him, and one another, demonstrates to be our Duty”. Since “God, at all Times, has given Mankind sufficient Means, of knowing whatever he requires of them”, and such requirements included neither worship nor faith, there was no need for revelation and worshipping churches. Since “the Religion of Nature is an absolutely perfect Religion; and … external Revelation can neither add to, nor take from its Perfection”, anything which deviated from or added to this religion of reason was actually detrimental and could only lead to “Superstition, and those innumerable Mischiefs, that Mankind, on the Account of Religion, have done either to themselves, or one another.” (Tindal 1730, v-vii) 
The British debates on religion fed directly into the French Enlightenment. Voltaire (1694-1778) Lettres Philosophiques (1734) – written after his forced sojourn in England in 1726-1729 – depicted a vivid and often hilarious picture of the British religious sects in which Quakers, Anglicans, Presbyterians, Socinians, and Anti-Trinitarians were the target of the irrepressible satirical wit of the French philosophe. The credibility of revelation was skewered by agile rapier thrusts of irony and sarcasm rather than being pounded by the heavy artillery of biblical criticism and syllogistic logic which had characterized the seventeenth-century attacks. Voltaire exposed and lampooned the hypocrisy and pettiness of organized churches and religious communities. So in the “land of sects” in which “an Englishman, as a free man, goes to Heaven by whatever route he likes”, “you cannot hold office in England or Ireland without being one of the Anglican faithful, and this, which is an excellent proof, has converted so many Nonconformists that today there is less than a twentieth of the nation outside the bosom of the dominant Church.” (Voltaire, Letters on England, Letter 5) As for the Quakers, “they date from Jesus Christ who, according to them, was the first Quaker” (Letter 3). The article “Foi” (Faith) of Voltaire’s Dictionnaire philosophique (1764) combined anti-clericalism with contempt for the very notion of religious faith, since it incited, in his view, to irrationality: “What is faith? Is it to believe what appears evident? No. It is evident to me that there is a necessary, eternal, supreme, intelligent being. This is not a matter of faith, but of reason. I have no merit in thinking that this eternal, infinite being, who is virtue, goodness itself, wants me to be good and virtuous. Faith consists in believing, not what appears to be true, but what appears to our understanding to be false.” (Voltaire, Philosophical Dictionary, 208) In other words, reason -- not revelation -- was the way to both God and morality. Miracles, such as “a dead man” walking “two leagues carrying his head in his arms”, did not fare better. Even apart from the question of whether miracles were supposed to violate immutable laws which, as such, could not be violated, was it not “the most absurd of follies to imagine that the infinite being would invert the eternal play of the immense engines which move the entire universe for the sake of three or four hundred ants on this little heap of mud?” (Voltaire, Philosophical Dictionary, 312). 
While Voltaire was amplifying objections to revelation common in English Deism, the Scot David Hume (1711-1776) dealt one of the most long-lasting blows to miracles as key credentials of revealed religion. In his Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (first published under a different title in 1748),​[10]​ the attack was launched on epistemological grounds. After declaring that “a wise man … proportions his belief to the evidence” (Section 10, Part I, § 4), Hume proceeded to show that no one was ever justified in believing reports of miracles because the evidence in favour of miracles was always outweighed by the evidence contrary to miracles. “A miracle”, as defined by Hume, was “a violation of the laws of nature” or, more accurately, “a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent” (Section 10, Part I, § 12). Since, on the one hand, “a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws” and, on the other hand, there must always be “a uniform experience against every miraculous event” in order for this event to count as a miracle, the weight of this uniform experience would always be superior to the weight of the testimony upon which a miracle is founded, no matter how well attested the miracle might be (Section 10, Part I, § 12; see also Part II, § 35). Moreover (Hume continued in the second part of his essay on miracles), “it is easy to show … that there never was a miraculous event established on so full an evidence”, for “there is not to be found, in all history, any miracle attested by a sufficient number of men, of such unquestioned good-sense, education, and learning, as to secure us against all delusion in themselves” (Section 10, Part II, §§ 14-15). Such delusion, Hume charged on, was fuelled by the human tendency toward beliefs which give rise to the agreeable emotion of surprise and wonder. The fact that reports of miraculous events were particularly abundant “among ignorant and barbarous nations” further weakened the case for miracles, exposing them as typical results of ignorance (Section 10, Part II, esp. §§ 16, 20). Finally, the miracles reported by different religious traditions in order to establish their different particular systems counted as contrary evidence opposite to each other (Section 10, Part II, § 24). Prophecies did not help either as credentials of revealed religion since, according to Hume, they also fell under the category of miracles. Hume’s conclusion was that belief in revealed religion could only amount to fideism: “Mere reason is insufficient to convince us of its veracity: And whoever is moved by Faith to assent to it, is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all the principles of his understanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience” (Section 10, Part II, § 41).
Back in France, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) joined his voice to the chorus castigating revelation for adulterating the pure religion of reason with its absurd doctrines: “The greatest ideas of the divinity come to us from reason alone. View the spectacle of nature; hear the inner voice. Has God not told everything to our eyes, to our conscience, to our judgment? What more will men tell us? Their revelations have only the effect of degrading God by giving Him human passions. I see that particular dogmas, far from clarifying the notions of the great Being, confuse them” (Émile, 295). By this time, the clandestine literature circulating in Europe had already made abundantly clear that it regarded the chief figures of the three main revealed religions -- Moses, Christ, and Mohammed – as straight “impostors”.​[11]​ 
The Deist agenda continued to be pursued across different countries, including Germany, where the publication by Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-1781) between 1774 and 1778 of seven fragments from Hermann Samuel Reimarus (1694-1768) Apologie oder Schutzschrift für die vernünftigen Vereher Gottes caused a wave of polemics. Reimarus’s fragments advanced the typically deistic view that the true religion was natural religion, that is, the rational universal religion with which the original teaching of Jesus coincided. The German Enlightenment, however, was a complex phenomenon of which Deist rejection of revelation was far from being a common trait. Theological rationalism took also the shape of Christian Wolff (1679-1754) self-assigned task of “taking theology to incontrovertible certainty” through the application of mathematical methods (Lebensbeschreibung, 121). In his Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, Wolff listed the signs which distinguished divine revelation from pseudo-revelations.​[12]​ First of all, the content of an authentic revelation must be something highly necessary for human beings to know but which they could not reach by unaided natural reason. “It is clear” Wolff ruled “that God does not reveal anything which we can discover by reason”, although such natural truths might be mixed with supernatural truths which are, strictly speaking, the object of revelation (Vernünftige Gedanken, 624-625). Moreover, revelation could never contradict necessary truths or command actions contrary to natural law, but could be contrary to contingent truths (Vernünftige Gedanken, pp. 625-627). As for the way in which God would reveal himself, Wolff peremptorily claimed that God would neither resort to superfluous miracles nor perform directly something which he could carry out through ordinary means. In addition, a genuine revelation must not use “more words than those necessary” for revealing the matter at hand, and “the words themselves must be intelligible” (Vernünftige Gedanken, pp. 628-629). For its part, the German movement known as ‘Neology’ (‘new doctrine’) emphasized the urgent need of revising dogmas, perceived as historically and culturally conditioned doctrines in need of rational reinterpretation. Although ‘neologist’ thinkers accepted revelation, their ‘scientific’ examination of scripture and tradition with the tools of philosophy, history, and philology produced a radically revised version of the Christian doctrine which was not far away from the Deist reduction of revealed theology to a set of fully comprehensible rational truths. 

The existence and the nature of God

The fortune of Voltaire’s “necessary, eternal, supreme, intelligent” God, whose existence was evidently known by natural reason, did not last long. To be sure, stacks of books duly demonstrated his existence, including Wolff’s ponderous scientific treatment of natural theology (Theologia naturalis, methodo scientifica pertractata 1736-7). Widely adopted as a textbook, Wolff’s treatise defined natural theology as the “science of those things which are possible per Deum [for and through God]” (Theologia naturalis 1736, part I, p. 1). According to Wolff’s influential taxonomy, natural theology was a branch of metaphysics which depended for its principles on the other three branches, namely psychology, cosmology, and ontology (Discursus praeliminaris de philosophia in genere 1728, § 99). In turn, psychology was based on cosmology and ontology, and cosmology depended on ontology. This idea of a systematic, hierarchical order of the branches of metaphysics inspired Kant’s later critique of rational theology and its arguments for the existence of God. In fact, not only Wolff’s taxonomy of the sciences but also his exposition of the arguments set the terms of the debate in Germany. Wolff’s main distinction in the panoply of traditional proofs was between a posteriori and a priori arguments. The first kind of arguments, starting “from the contemplation of the world” and concluding with the world’s “utter dependence on God” (Theologia naturalis 1737, Preface to part II) was expounded in the first part of the Theologia naturalis, which confidently demonstrated a posteriori God’s existence as well as his attributes. The first, key step was proving the existence of a necessary being which, as such, was an ens a se, whose existence did not depend on anything else, and whose essence contained the reason of its existence. It was only after unpacking the attributes of such a being that Wolff finally concluded in paragraphs 67 and 69 of the first chapter that “By God we understand ens a se”; and given the existence of the ens a se, “God is given [Datur Deus]”. The second part of the Theologia naturalis turned to the classic a priori argument, namely the demonstration of God’s existence “from the notion of ens perfectissimum”, followed by the deduction of his attributes “from the contemplation of our soul” (Theologia naturalis 1737, Preface to part II). 
In a much more light-hearted way, Voltaire also argued for God’s existence. In the first of his Homélies delivered in London in 1765, the so-called ‘design argument’ was pressed into service.​[13]​ Its being more easily accommodated to the average, philosophically untutored intelligence than weighty, Wolffian metaphysical considerations made it the most popular argument circulating in churches and religious congregations. Interestingly, its eighteenth-century version was propelled by the discoveries of the new science. Architects of the ‘scientific revolution’ of the previous century such as Robert Boyle (1627-1691) and Isaac Newton (1642–1727) were enthusiastic proponents. They saw their scientific advances as progressively uncovering undeniable evidence of intelligence and design. The complexity and purposiveness of organisms discovered by the era’s fast-moving biological and botanical research seemed to point toward an analogy between organisms and artefacts. The amazing microcosm revealed by microscopists supported this trend. Meanwhile the telescopists were peering into the Heavens revealing the equally marvelous intricacies of the macrocosm. The discovery of the beautiful mathematical regularities of the laws of nature seemed to suggest the existence of an omniscient and omnipotent mathematician in chief. The majestic Pantokrator presented by Newton in the general scholium added to the second edition of his Principia Mathematica (1713) epitomized the blossoming physico-theology of the eighteenth century: “This most beautiful system of the Sun, Planets and Comets, could only proceed from the counsel and dominion of an intelligent and powerful being. … This Being governs all things, not as soul of the world, but as Lord over all: And on account of his dominion he is wont to be called Lord God Pantokrator, or Universal Ruler.” (Mathematical Principles, vol. 2, 389) In the same year, the prestigious Boyle Lectures, preached in 1711 and 1712 by William Derham, appeared in London under the title of Physico-Theology: or, A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, from the Works of Creation. They were destined to undergo many editions and several translations. A thinker of the caliber of George Berkeley gave his own highly original slant to the design argument, employing it not only to support theism but to advance his immaterialist metaphysics: “if we attentively consider the constant regularity, order, and concatenation of natural things, the surprising magnificence, beauty, and perfection of the larger, and the exquisite contrivance of the smaller parts of the creation … and at the same time attend to the meaning and import of the attributes, one, eternal, infinitely wise, good, perfect, we shall clearly perceive that they belong to the aforesaid spirit, who works all in all, and by whom all things consist.” (Treatise 1710, Part I, section 146).          
Voltaire’s version of the argument, by contrast, contained little that was original; but the trademark wit of the French philosophe did more than hefty refutations to undermine the facile discovery of all manners of divine purposes and designs in the world of nature. For instance, the entry “Fin, causes finales” in Voltaire’s Philosophical Dictionary famously declared that “it is as true to say that noses were made to wear glasses, and fingers to be decorated with diamonds, as it is true to say that ears were formed to hear sounds, and eyes to receive light.” (Philosophical Dictionary, 205). Yet despite the ridiculousness into which the argument seemed prone to slide, Voltaire continued to maintain that the world was the product of a divine power. Rousseau’s rational enquiry brought him to the same conclusion. Having “resolved to accept as evident all knowledge to which in the sincerity of my heart I cannot refuse my consent” (Émile, Book IV, 269-270), Rousseau observed that “the first causes of motion are not in matter. It receives motion and communicates it, but it does not produce it.” Since “to suppose an infinite regress of causes is to suppose no cause at all”, and “every motion not produced by another can come only from a spontaneous, voluntary action”, he concluded that “a will moves the universe and animates nature” (Émile, Book IV, 273). From the discovery that “moved matter shows me a will”, he rapidly progressed to the view that “matter moved according to certain laws shows me an intelligence” (Émile, Book IV, 275). In short, his deepest intuitions told him that “the world is governed by a powerful and wise will. I see it or, rather, I sense it; and that is something important for me to know. But is this same world eternal or created? Is there a single principle of things? Or, are there two or many of them, and what is their nature? I know nothing about all this, and what does it matter to me?” (Émile, Book IV, 276-277). 
The Newtonian Samuel Clarke (1675-1729) had thought, on the contrary, that a good deal more could be known, and should be said, about God. His highly influential Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God (London 1705), reworking eight sermons delivered the year before for the Boyle Lecture, marked the eighteenth century debate about the existence and nature of God. Clarke saw the main danger for religion in naturalism, that is, in that brand of atheism which, rather than directly denying the existence of God, identified God with nature. Hobbes and Spinoza, explicitly named in the title-page of his book, loomed large as the targets of Clarke’s attack against “all those … who deny the Principal Attributes of the Divine Nature, and suppose God to be an Unintelligent Being, which acts merely by Necessity” (pp. 1-2). Against such writers he endeavored to show “that the Being and Attributes of God, are not only possible or barely probable in themselves, but also strictly demonstrable to any unprejudiced Mind from the most incontestable Principles of Reason” (p. 14). Clarke’s aim was to convince unbelievers on purely rational grounds. Although acknowledging the existence of other valuable arguments, he did not regard them as having the conclusive force of demonstration required by his ambitious project. Instead of proposing a variety of merely probabilistic arguments, he focused therefore on “One clear and plain Series of Propositions necessarily connected and following one from another, to demonstrate the Certainty of the Being of God, and to deduce in order the Necessary attributes of his Nature” (p. 16). The first “evident and undeniable” proposition was that “Something has existed from all Eternity … For since Something Now Is; ’tis manifest that Something always Was: Otherwise the Things that Now Are, must have risen out of Nothing, absolutely and without Cause … Whatever Exists, has a Cause of its Existence, either in the Necessity of its own Nature; and then it must have been Eternal: Or in the Will of some other Being” (pp. 18-19). 
This first proposition constituted, according to Clarke, the starting point of a chain of necessary deductions. From the first proposition followed the second, according to which “There has Existed from Eternity Some One Unchangeable and Independent Being. For since something must needs have been from Eternity … Either there had always existed One Unchangeable and Independent Being, from which all other Beings that are or ever were in the Universe have received their Original; or else there has been an infinite Succession of changeable and dependent Beings, produced one from another in an endless Progression, without any Original Cause at all” (pp. 23-24). The second scenario was judged by Clarke “an express Contradiction and Impossibility” (p. 26) because such infinite succession of “merely Dependent Beings” would be a series of beings which has no “Reason at all of its Existence” (pp. 25-26). It followed that: “(III.) That Unchangeable and Independent Being, which has Existed from Eternity, without any external Cause of its Existence, must be self-existent, that is, Necessarily existing” (p. 27). Having thus reached the existence of a Necessary Being, Clarke pressed on with propositions IV-XII. This Self-Existent Being “must of Necessity be Eternal,” “Infinite and Omnipresent”, and “One” (propositions V-VII). Moreover, it “must be an Intelligent Being” (prop. VIII).
The latter attribute, Clarke conceded, could not be “Demonstrated strictly and properly a priori”, as the other attributes necessarily implied in the notion of self-existent being had been. As Clarke indicated with pellucid clarity, it constituted however the crux of the matter in the dispute with the atheists: “For that Something must be Self-Existent; and that That which is Self-Existent, must necessarily be Eternal and Infinite and the Original Cause of all things; will not bear much dispute. But all Atheists … have always asserted and must maintain, either directly or indirectly, that the Self-Existent Being is not an Intelligent Being, but either pure inactive Matter, or (which in other words is the very same thing) a mere Necessary Agent” (pp. 101-102). Old and new atheists alike could easily agree on a being endowed with metaphysical attributes deducible a priori from the notion of self-existent or necessary being. The real issue was that of the moral attributes of such a being. To have a ‘God’ who was not just ‘Nature’ one needed to show that the self-existent being was endowed with the kind of intelligence which supported “Power of Will and Choice” (p. 102). Luckily for Clarke, such intelligence was demonstrable a posteriori since “the World, and all things therein” could be shown to be “the Effects of an Intelligent and Knowing Cause” (p. 103). There followed the attribution to this Intelligent Being of liberty and choice (prop. IX), infinite power (prop. X), infinite wisdom (prop. XI), and “infinite Goodness, Justice and Truth, and all other Moral Perfections” (prop. XII). In short, Clarke presented a version of what would be later called (following Kant) ‘cosmological argument’, combined with considerations of order in the world to attribute intelligence, power of choice, and goodness to the self-existent cause of all things. Like Kant, Clarke realized that the design argument was not self-standing. To be fully effective it needed to rest on previously established metaphysical premises.
David Hume nevertheless remained unconvinced. Hume’s attack was not, however, a direct attack against the being of God. “Surely”, Philo said in Hume’s posthumously published Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779), “where reasonable men treat these subjects, the question can never be concerning the being, but only the nature of the Deity. The former truth … is unquestionable and self-evident. Nothing exists without a cause; and the original cause of this universe (whatever it be) we call God” (Dialogues, Part II, 44).​[14]​ As Clarke had seen, the crucial issue was not the existence of ‘God’ intended as the cause of the universe. The crucial issue was the nature of God. It could turn out that God was neither intelligent nor good -- ‘God’ could turn out to be the blind casual force of nature. 
Of course some French philosophes had already circumvented Hume’s ambiguous formulations and religious skepticism and headed straight to the conclusion that talking of ‘God’ was just an anthropomorphic way of talking of ‘Nature’. In chapter IV of the second part of his Systême de la Nature (1770), Paul-Henri Thiry baron d’Holbach (1723-1789) examined Clarke’s arguments for God’s existence precisely to show that the metaphysical attributes referred to nature. D’Holbach conceded the evidence of Clarke’s first proposition -- “Something existed from all eternity” -- but only to add straight away: “We will say to Mr Clarke that it is matter, that it is nature acting by its own energy … which has always existed” (pp. 101-102). Hume’s skeptical stance, however, proved perhaps the most effective of all in undermining confidence in the traditional arguments for the existence of God. In part II of the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Cleanthes asserted with gusto a mechanistic, updated version of the design argument’s claims which continued to strike a cord with the Deism contemporary to Hume: 

Look round the world: Contemplate the whole and every part of it: You will find it to be nothing but one great machine, subdivided into an infinite number of lesser machines,​[15]​ which again admit of subdivisions, to a degree beyond what human senses and faculties can trace and explain. All these various machines, and even their most minute parts, are adjusted to each other with an accuracy, which ravishes into admiration all men, who have ever contemplated them. The curious adapting of means to ends, throughout all nature, resembles exactly, though it much exceeds, the productions of human contrivance; of human design, thought, wisdom, and intelligence. Since therefore the effects resemble each other, we are lead to infer, by all the rules of analogy, that the causes also resemble; and that the Author of Nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man; though possessed of much larger faculties, proportioned to the grandeur of the work, which he has executed. By this argument a posteriori, and by this argument alone, do we prove at once the existence of a Deity, and his similarity to human mind and intelligence. (Dialogues, Part II, 45)  

All three main characters of the Dialogues – Cleanthes, Philo and Demea – granted the adaptation in nature of means to ends, but Philo swiftly pointed out that “wherever you depart, in the least, from the similarity of the cases, you diminish proportionably the evidence; and may at last bring it to a very weak analogy, which is confessedly liable to error and uncertainty” (Dialogues, Part II, 46). Hume had already made a similar point in the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding: “when we infer any particular cause from an effect, we must proportion the one to the other, and can never be allowed to ascribe to the cause any qualities, but what are exactly sufficient to produce the effect” (Enquiry, Section 11, § 12). Although (as noted by early critics) such a strict proportion between cause and effect might well not be typical of generally accepted inferences from effects to their causes, Hume’s point did not fail to raise far-reaching doubts regarding the legitimacy of identifying the cause of the universe with a singular, intelligent being endowed with attributes similar to those of human beings. Apart from the objectionable anthropomorphism of such an inference, the presence of different “springs and principles” in nature seemed to point to a multiplicity of designers or artisans in a way indeed similar to what we experience with human artefacts. Similarity with this experience would also suggest that “many worlds might have been botched and bungled, throughout an eternity, ere this system was struck out” (Dialogues, Part V, 69). Moreover, the very question of whether the world was really similar to an artefact was not so easily settled. The evidence coming from experience supported equally well (if not better) the view that the universe was similar to an organized body or vegetable. One could therefore infer that the world “is an animal, and the Deity is the SOUL of the world, actuating it, and actuated by it” (Dialogues, Part VI, 73). Given our ignorance of the essence of matter and mind, Hume remarked further, there was also no basis in experience for establishing the priority of thought over matter: “In all instances which we have ever seen, thought has no influence upon matter, except where that matter is so conjoined with it, as to have an equal reciprocal influence upon it” (Dialogues, Part VIII, 88). Thought could have resulted from the ordering of matter, rather than the order of matter resulting from thought. If, in addition, one espoused Hume’s account of causation as the observation of constant conjunction, the uniqueness of this particular effect – the world – rendered any causal inference structurally impossible due to the impossibility of observing the constant conjunction with a putative cause. The last nail in the coffin of the design argument was the ever returning problem of evil. With so much evil in the world how could one infer the goodness of the world’s cause? On the contrary, “the whole presents nothing but the idea of a blind nature, impregnated by a great vivifying principle, and pouring forth from her lap, without discernment or parental care, her maimed and abortive children” (Dialogues, Part XI, 113). In summary, although experience supported the conclusion that there was some kind of design in nature in the sense of an adaptation of means to ends, it could not go any further in establishing the design’s cause, let alone the nature of such cause.
	Hume knew, however, that natural theologians had other weapons in their arsenal. One could indeed think that by undermining the design argument he had barely made a dent in their reserves. After all Clarke had not led his charge by trumpeting design discernable a posteriori but by reaching the notion of ‘necessary being’ and deducing from it metaphysical attributes of the Deity through conceptual analysis. It was on that basis that he had built his arguments for the intelligence and moral attributes of God. Although Hume did not seem to appreciate that the design argument was not meant to be self-standing,​[16]​  he saw that the core of Clarke’s argument still needed addressing. In the face of the objections plaguing the design argument, Demea urged in part IX of the Dialogues the abandonment of ineffective a posteriori efforts and the pursuit instead of the “simple and sublime argument a priori”. Such a description did not refer (as Wolff would have done) to a version of the so-called ontological argument, but to a muddled version of Clarke’s ‘cosmological’ argument: 

Whatever exists must have a cause or reason of its existence; it being absolutely impossible for any thing to produce itself, or be the cause of its own existence. In mounting up, therefore, from effects to causes, we must either go on tracing an infinite succession, without any ultimate cause at all, or must at last have recourse to some ultimate cause, that is necessarily existent … What was it, then, which determined something to exist rather than nothing, and bestowed being on a particular possibility, exclusive of the rest? … Was it nothing? But that can never produce any thing. We must, therefore, have recourse to a necessarily existent Being, who carries the REASON of his existence in himself; and who cannot be supposed not to exist without an express contradiction. There is consequently such a Being, that is, there is a Deity. (Dialogues, Part IX, 90-91)

The nerve of Hume’s critique anticipated Kant’s famous blow to the ontological argument as well as the view that the cosmological argument failed because it depended on the ontological argument, that is, it depended on the coherence of the concept of ‘necessary being’. Existence, Hume pointed out, was a matter of fact. As such it could not be proved a priori, that is, it could not be deduced by conceptual analysis, since existence was not included in the concept of something. As Hume had written in A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40): “the idea of existence is nothing different from the idea of any object, and … when after the simple conception of any thing we wou’d conceive it as existent, we in reality make no addition to or alteration on our first idea” (Book 1, Part 3, Section 7; Norton and Norton ed. pp. 65-66). Ergo, the notion of a “necessarily existent Being” could not be a coherent concept. In the Dialogues Hume concluded that “There is no Being, therefore, whose non-existence implies a contradiction”; the words necessary existence had “no meaning; or, which is the same thing, none that is consistent” (Dialogues, Part IX, 91-92).




Supporters of natural theology might well have thought that Paley’s valiant and seemingly successful efforts opened the nineteenth century on a high note. By this time, however, plenty of people had reached the conclusion that, all considered, theoretical or speculative reason did not lead to God. Despite the Enlightenment’s high praises for the power of reason and the Deists’s fanfare proclaiming the virtues of rational religion over dubious revelations, the warnings of the limitations of natural reason sounded by Bayle’s fideistic register continued to resonate throughout the eighteenth century. The fideistic aspect of Bayle’s polymorph legacy converged with worries about the sorry state of human reason due to the fall, the emphasis on the centrality of grace and election, the acute awareness of the distance between God and creatures, and the role of emotions and feeling in religion. Far from regarding reason as the source of truth which leads to salvation, a broad range of thinkers saw theoretical reason as structurally incapable of leading anywhere near the divine realm. Morality rather than dogmas and doctrines paved the way to God. The distinction between above and contrary to reason did not matter either, not because (as in the case of theological rationalism) all doctrines above (human) reason had been discarded as straight absurdities, but because all divine matters were above the proper compass of natural reason. Whether the latter declared them contrary to its judgments was of no consequence, owing to its incompetence to judge in the first place. 
The Protestant world seemed particularly receptive to this warning, although the Roman Catholic camp did not lack its own skeptical voices toward the possible contribution of reason to religion. The Jansenists -- named after the Flemish Catholic bishop, Cornelius Jansen (1585-1638) -- denounced the dangers for religion of Cartesian rationalism, on the one hand, and of Jesuit Aristotelian scholasticism, on the other hand. Doubts were raised by a Sorbonne theologian, Nicolas l’Herminier (1657-1735), about the merits of the arguments for the existence of God. But where speculative reason seemed to fail, practical reason and morality appeared to fare better. Pietism -- a religious movement which was marked by the publication in 1675 of the Pia desideria by Philipp Jakob Spener (1635-1705) and which grew strong in Lutheran Germany -- stressed practice over doctrine. What mattered in Christianity was not the assent to abstract doctrines but love of God and the neighbor. Reacting against the intellectualist approach of the so-called Schulphilosophie, Pietism tended to detach religion from philosophical speculations. In his Vernunftlehre of 1691, the influential German author, Christian Thomasius (1655-1728), exhibited a hostility toward metaphysics which he shared with Pietism. Reason and philosophy should have a practical goal, namely the advancement of the common good through rational love. There was no use for abstract metaphysical discussions especially in the sphere of faith. Philosophy should instead deal with ethical questions.
	Some of the views of Pietism exercised a lasting impact on Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). In his epoch-making Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Critique of Pure Reason) (1781; 2nd ed. 1787) he maintained that reason “in its merely speculative use” is inadequate for the great aim of “attaining to the existence of a supreme being”.​[17]​ A demonstration of the existence of God would demand “an extension of our cognition beyond all the boundaries of experience”, employing principles of reason which are “only of immanent validity, i.e., they are related solely to objects of empirical cognition” (Critique, A637/B665-A642/B670).​[18]​ Kant came to this conclusion after dismantling the main arguments for the existence of God. In one of his early, pre-critical writings, Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes (The only possible argument in support of a demonstration of the existence of God) (1763), he introduced the hugely successful terminology of “ontological” and “cosmological” proofs (see Ak 2: 160). The ontological argument was criticized there on grounds which the Critique of Pure Reason rendered famous, namely “that existence is really not a predicate of a thing at all” and “nothing more is posited through an existent thing than is posited in a merely possible thing (for then one is speaking of the predicates of that thing)” (The Only Possible Argument, Ak 2: 75). In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant explained with an example: “a hundred actual dollars do not contain the least bit more than a hundred possible ones. … But in my financial condition there is more with a hundred actual dollars than with the mere concept of them (i.e. their possibility). … yet the hundred dollars themselves that I am thinking of are not in the least increased through this being outside my concept” (A599/B627). Existence “is merely the positing of a thing” (A596/B624). 
Having shown “the impossibility of an ontological proof of God’s existence” (A592/B620), since “every existential proposition is synthetic” (A598/B626) and cannot therefore be proved a priori, the Critique pressed the “impossibility of a cosmological proof” as well (cf. A603/B631-A614/B642). This is a proof which is a posteriori since it “starts from experience … and because the object of all possible experience is called ‘world,’ it is therefore termed the cosmological proof” (A605/B633). Its first step, as conceived by Kant, was as follows: “If something exists, then an absolutely necessary being also has to exist. Now I myself, at least, exist; therefore, an absolutely necessary being exists. The minor premise contains an experience, the major premise an inference from an experience in general to the existence of something necessary” (A604/B632-A605/B633). So far so good, it seemed, since “in order to ground itself securely, this proof gets a footing in experience”. The problem, as Kant saw it, was that “the cosmological proof avails itself of this experience only to make a single step, namely to the existence of a necessary being in general. What this being might have in the way of properties, the empirical ground of proof cannot teach; rather here reason says farewell to it entirely and turns its inquiry back to mere concepts”. That is, in order to establish “what kinds of properties in general an absolutely necessary being would have to have” (A605/B633), the cosmological proof turned at this point from experience to the pure a priori concepts on which the ontological proof rested. The second step of the proof consisted in showing that the concept of ens realissimum (the most real being or the highest being) was “the one single concept, that fits necessary existence and is adequate to it” (A607/B635); and since a necessary being existed (first step of the proof), there necessarily existed a highest being (A605/B633-A606/B634). The cosmological argument, Kant concluded, was just “an old argument in disguised form as a new one” (A605/B633) – and that old “unfortunate ontological proof” (A604/B632) having already been shown to be impossible, it precipitated the down-fall of the cosmological argument as well. 
Of course one could have objected that if the problems began with step two of the proof one could just stop with the first step and rest content with the demonstration of the existence of an absolutely necessary being. According to Kant, however, the first step was not independent of the second step: “it is really only the ontological proof from mere concepts that contains all the force of proof in the so-called cosmological proof”, since only the ontological proof could provide “the conditions for the possibility of an absolutely necessary being” through the concept of ens realissimum (A607/B635). Clearly, if we had such an insight into the possibility of a necessary being, its existence would be established too (A608/B636). But we don’t, and “unconditioned necessity, which we need so indispensably as the ultimate sustainer of all things, is for human reason the true abyss” (A613/B641).
The third and final blow was dealt to the “physico-theological proof” (that is, roughly, the design argument), which was also declared impossible (cf. A620/B648-A630-B658). Unlike the cosmological proof, which abstracted “from every particular property of objects of experience through which this world might differ from any other possible world”, the physico-theological proof used “observations about the particular constitution of this sensible world of ours for its grounds of proof” (A605/B633). In other words, while the cosmological proof considered “any existence in general”, the physico-theological proof turned to the “determinate experience” of the order and constitution of things in the present world (A620/B648). The trouble with this argument was that it “could at most establish a highest architect of the world, who would always be limited by the suitability of the material on which he works, but not a creator of the world, to whose idea everything is subject, which is far from sufficient for the great aim one has in view, namely that of proving an all-sufficient original being” (A627/B655). In order to achieve that higher aim, the physico-theological proof “suddenly jumps over to the cosmological proof, and since this is only a concealed ontological proof”, the physico-theological proof could not but fail with it (A629/B657).
According to Kant, however, reason’s path to God was not irremediably blocked. Quite the opposite. Although reason in its speculative use could not demonstrate the existence of God, practical reason did lead to its affirmation. Already in his lectures on metaphysics of the mid 1770s, Kant proclaimed that “the main point is always morality”. Morality is “the ground and the purpose of all our speculations and investigations. All metaphysical speculations aim at it” (Ak 28: 301). This primacy of practical over speculative reason was reflected in our cognition of God. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant defined theoretical cognition as “that through which I cognize what exists”, and practical cognition as “that through which I represent what ought to exist” (A632/B660-A634/B662). In the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (Critique of Practical Reason) (1788), he explained that the existence of God ought to be affirmed as a postulate of practical reason (Ak 5:124-132). Together with immortality and freedom, God’s existence must be postulated in order to establish reverence for the moral law and the conditions of possibility of its realization (cf. Ak 5: 132-134). As Kant had already said in the Critique of Pure Reason, “since there are practical laws that are absolutely necessary (the moral laws), then if these necessarily presuppose any existence as the condition of the possibility of their binding force, this existence has to be postulated” (A632/B660-A634/B662). As a postulate of practical reason, the existence of God was not a “theoretical dogma” but a “presupposition” – “the presupposition of the highest independent good”. Practical reason furnished significance for practical purposes to the “theological concept of the original being” which speculative reason could not attain (cf. Critique of Practical Reason, Ak 5: 132-134).
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^1	  See Antognazza 1996.
^2	  See Bayle, Dictionaire, article “Acosta”, G.
^3	  See Bayle, Dictionaire, article “Manichéens”, D.
^4	  Cf. for instance Bayle, Dictionaire, articles “Bunel”, E; “Pyrrhon”, G.
^5	  The name ‘Socinianism’ derived from the Italian antitrinitarian theologian, Fausto Sozzini or Faustus Socinus (1539-1604).
^6	  John Clarke in the “Preface” to his translation of De Veritate (The Truth of the Christian Religion. London 1743).
^7	  See especially Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, Book IV, Ch. Xvii, §§ 23-24 and Ch. Xviii; Leibniz, Theodicy, ‘Preliminary Discourse’.
^8	  According to Kant, for instance, Deists were those who represented God “merely as a cause of the world”, as opposed to Theists who represented God “as an author of the world” (Critique of Pure Reason A631/B659-A632/B660).
^9	  This is an enlarged version of Herbert’s De Veritate, first published in Paris in 1624.
^10	  The Enquiry went through eleven editions prepared by Hume, in which various changes were introduced in Section 10 on miracles. The critical edition by Tom L. Beauchamp (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), cited here, is based on the last edition published under Hume’s supervision in 1772; it follows the posthumous edition of 1777 in the case of substantive final changes by Hume.
^11	  Cf. the famous Livre des trois Imposteurs. Although published in Amsterdam in 1719, this work was also circulated as a manuscript under different titles.
^12	  Wolff’s Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, also know as his ‘German Metaphysics’, was first published in Halle in 1719. Quotations are from the 1738 edition.
^13	  Voltaire used the blueprint of Samuel Clarke’s influential arguments in the Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God (see below), progressing from a version of the cosmological argument to a version of the design argument.  
^14	  It should be noted that Hume in the Dialogues uses a metaphysically robust notion of cause which sits uneasily with his usual, deflationary theory of causation. Quotations from Hume’s Dialogues are from J. C. A. Gaskin’s edition of 1993 (Oxford University Press), based on Norman Kemp Smith’s text (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1935).
^15	  As noted by Stewart 2006, p. 718, this image of machines within machines was inspired by George Cheyne’s Philosophical Principles of Religion, Natural and Revealed (London 1715; 5th edition 1736). 
^16	  See Stewart 2006, pp. 721-722.
^17	  According to Kant, theoretical cognition is speculative when “it pertains to an object or concepts of an object to which one cannot attain in any experience” (Critique of Pure Reason A634/B662). For a definition of theoretical cognition see below. 
^18	  Cf. A295-6/B352: Kant called immanent principles those principles “whose application stays wholly and completely within the limits of possible experience”. 
^19	  I am grateful to Howard Hotson for his feedback on a mature draft of this chapter.
